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is a privilege in which courts often indulge, and where the
equity and justice are obvious, as in this case, no exception
should be taken. The discretion given to the Board of Directors by the legislature provided the very lobp hole
through which it was possible to meet the exigencies of a
changed society, and thus to permit the government in this
instance to function.
-MosE

EDWIN BOIARSKY.

REAL PROPERTY-DEEDS-DELIVERY TO GRANTEE ON CONDITION.-It is disconcerting to the ordinary man unlearned in

law to discover that a transaction which seems to him natural
and reasonable has been construed by the courts into something quite different from what he had intended. Such is
the case where one executed a deed to land and gives it
to his grantee with the understanding that it is to take
effect only upon the happening oi some condition. The
courts to his astonishment refuse to recognize his intention,
but attribute an utterly foreign meaning to his act, a meaning drawn from an old and technical rule of the common
law the reason for which, if any ever existed, has long since
vanished. He finds little consolation for his unjust treatment in being informed that it is the law that though he
intended a conditional delivery, his act nevertheless amounts
to an absolute delivery. A good example of such an injustice based on this ancient legal formula is found in the
case of Rouss v. Rouss. 1 Defendant, in that case, a devisee
under her husband's will of a life estate on condition that
she did not remarry, persuaded plaintiff-who was remainderman in fee following said widow's life estate under
the will, contingent upon his paying six $2,000 legacies to
nephews and a niece of testator on termination of said life
estate-to execute a quitclaim deed of a life estate in her
favor free from the condition as to remarriage. She secured
the deed upon her promise not to use it until she should
1 90 W. Va. 646. 111 S. E. 586 (1922).
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obtain an agreement signed by the six legatees to postpone
payment of the legacies until after her death. Having secured but one name to the agreement and failing in an attempt to get the other five legatees to sign, she recorded the
deed, renounced the will, and then married the legatee who
had signed. As a consequence she got her husband's personal estate, a second husband, and an unconditional life
estate in the real property, while plaintiff has $10,000 to
pay in legacies due on the remainder and must await her
death to get possession of the property. The court held
that deligery of the deed to the grantee was absolute.
In the above holding the West Virginia court again followed the technical common law rule that there can be no
delivery in escrow to the grantee. The result seems unjust
to the grantor. Th court follows Dorr v. Midelburg,2 and
Heck v. Morgan,3 the latter containing merely a dictum on the
point. To the same effect is Gaffney v. Stowers4 which was
not cited in the principal case. There it was held that an oil
and gas lease complete on its face, cannot be delivered as an
escrow to the grantee, such delivery being absolute. In a still
more recent case, Henley v. Swan,5 the court without discussion laid down the same rule. Thus in a space of fourteen
years the subject has five times come before the court which
tends to show the frequency with which men have used this
type of transaction, as doubtless men not learned in the law
will continue to use it.
What sound principle supports this doctrine? The courts
generally lay down as the basis for the rule an old statement taken from SHEPPARD'S TOUCHSTONE' to 'the effect
that, "If a man deliver a writing sealed to the party to
whom it is made, as an escrow to be his deed upon certain
conditions, etc., this is an absolute delivery of the deed
* * * and tradition only is requisite; and then when the
words are contrary to the act which is the delivery, the
words are of none effect." Courts have been adhering to
a conception of delivery which they repudiate in other situations.
"This crude conception of manual transfer has been su- 65 W. Va. 778, 65 S. E. 97 (1909).
88 W. Va. 102, 106 S. E. 413 (1921).
773 W. Va. 420, 80 S. E. 501 (1913).
93 W. Va. 49, 116 S. E. 864 (1923).
0 1 SHEP. TOUCH.
(BY ATHERLY) 50.
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perceded by the more enlightened view that whether an
instrument has been delivered, is a question of intention
merely, there being sufficient delivery if an intention appears that it shall be legally operative, however that intention be indicated." 7 Again, Professor Tiffany says that this
idea of physical transfer rather than intention being the
operative force springs from the "primitive formalism"
which still clings to the law of deeds." It was the authority
and vogue of Coke's and Sheppard's writing to which Professor Wigmore attributes the responsibility for the suppression of the more progressive view. He says it is an
arbitrary distinction, justified by neither reason nor policy.)
In every other instance intention is the controlling factor in
delivery. The grantor may hand the deed to the grantee
to take to his attorney for inspection without effecting a
delivery.10 If the grantee gets possession of the instrument
from the hands of the third party to whom it has been
handed as an escrow, without performance of the condition
Also it has been held that where the
no title passes."
a
deed
to the grantee to hand to a third
grantor hands
party there is no delivery. 1 2 In these instances the tradition
was not controlling, the court looking to the intention with
which it was made. Yet the very opposite view is invoked
in cases where the conditional delivery is to the grantee.
Miller, J., in Dorr v. Midelburg,'13 lays down as a reason for
the doctrine that title must necessarily pass from the first
delivery, since the grantee cannot act as agent of both himself and the grantor for purposes of second delivery. One
is impelled to inquire why? Another reason offered is
that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict
a written instrument, and consequently parol evidence is
inadmissible to show that a deed absolute on its face is
conditional. Delivery being a matter of intention, to be
gained from the acts and words of the parties, is necessarily
proved by parol evidence. If admissible to prove delivery
there is no reason for excluding it as to conditional delivery,
7 TIFFANY,

REAL PROPERTY, (2d ed.) vol. 2, 1737.
8 T1PFANY, REAL PRoPERTY, (2d ed.) vol. 2, §462.
o WIOxom, EVIDENCE, vol. 4, §2405.
10 Curry v. Colburn, 99 Wis. 319, 74 N. W. 778 (1898).

2, White v. Core, 20 W. Va. 272 (1882).
12 Cherry v. Herring, 83 Ala. 458, 3 So. 667 (1888) ; Brown v. Reynolds, 37 Tenn.
(8 Sneed) 639 (1858) ; Fairbanks v. Metcalf, 8 Mass. 280 (1811).
18

Supra, n. 2.
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and some courts have so held. Inman v. Quirey.14 The plain
answer to the objection is that the parol evidence is admitted
to prove there is no deed and it in no way varies any term of
the instrument. See Pym v. Campbell.1r
In Newlin v. Beard 6 and Stuart v. Livesay 7 the court held
that a note may be delivered to the obligee to take effect on
the happening of a condition. In Hickg v. Goode' 8 a conditional delivery of a bond to the obligee was upheld. Courts
have not been prone to break away from the old rule in
the case of deeds though there is a modern tendency in that
direction. In Whitaker v. Lane0 the Virginia court after an
exhaustive review of the authorities repudiated the doctrine
of its prior decisions and admitted parol evidence to show
conditional delivery of a sealed contract. This case was
followed by Burnett v. Rhudy 20 where a conditional delivery
of a deed to the grantee was sustained. The Illinois 21 and
California 22 courts when confronted with a hard case held
that there had been no delivery at all, which would seem
to give effect to the condition. In the latter the court said
that it is not sufficient that there be mere delivery of possession, but that there must be the intention to deliver. In
the light of this modern tendency to break away from a rule
unsound in principle and in its application working such
obvious injustice as in Rouss v. Rouss2 the West Virginia
court might have seen fit to discard it though in its holding
the court is entirely in accord with the weight of authority
in this country. But certainly this is a technical rule which
has far outlived its usefulness, if it had any, and its destruction would be an improvement of our real property law.
-MARY
14128

FRANCES BROWN.

Ark. 606. 194 S. W. 858 (1917).

15 6 E. & B. 870 (1866).
1* 6 W. Va. 110 (1873).
4 W. Va. 45 (1870).

15 12 Leigh 479 (1842).
11 128 Va. 317, 104 S. E. 252 (1920).
20 187 Va. 67, 119 S. E. 97 (1923).
21 Stanley v. White, 160 IUl. 605, 43 N. E. 729 (1896)

128 N. E. 816 (1920).

Mitchell v. Clem, 295 Ill. 160,

2 Kennedy v. Parks, 137 Cal. 627, 70 Pac. 656 (1902).
23 Supra, n. 1.
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